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COMMENT
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -STOP AND FRISK: WARRANTLESS
CAR SEARcHEs - Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
N the predawn hours of October 30, 1966, a police officer on
car patrol in a "high-crime area"' of Bridgeport, Connecticut,
was approached by an "informant" who had supplied him in-
formation in the past.2 This informant reported to the officer
that an individual (later identified as Williams) sitting in a
vehicle nearby was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his
waist.3 With no further verification or corroboration, after
making a radio call for assistance, the officer approached the
vehicle. When Williams rolled down the window in response
to the officer's request to open the door, the officer reached
in and removed a loaded pistol from Williams' waistband.
4
Upon seizing the pistol the officer arrested Williams for un-
lawful possession of a handgun. Later, after other officers had
arrived, a more thorough search was conducted of Williams'
person and the car. This search turned up not only substantial
quantities of heroin on his person and in his car, but also
another pistol and a machete in the car.
Williams was subsequently charged and convicted of both
the illegal possession of a handgun and of heroin, and, in 1968,
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the conviction
was affirmed.5 Two years later, on petition for federal habeas
corpus relief which had been denied in federal district court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
denied Williams' petition and affirmed the conviction.6 On
1 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972). This particularly graphic
bit of imagery represents what was undoubtedly an important factor
in the Court's consideration of the factual circumstances relevant to
the case, especially as it relates to the Court's justification of the police
officer's actions under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See p. 244 infra.
2 407 U.S. at 146.
3 Id. at 144-45. There is evidence of some discrepancy in this version of
how the police officer became aware of Williams' activities. In dissent,
Circuit Judge Friendly noted that in the first hearing on a motion to
suppress in the trial court, the officer indicated that he approached
Williams in response to a police signal telling him to go to Williams'
car; in a second hearing on the motion, however, the officer's testimony
recounted the unnamed informant version here outlined by the Court.
Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 39 n.9 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissent).
4 It is acknowledged that the pistol was not visible to the officer from
outside the car. 407 U.S. at 145.
5 Connecticut v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968).
"Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970).
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rehearing, however, the circuit court reversed itself and set the
conviction aside.7 In June of 1972, on certiorari to the court
of appeals, the United States Supreme Court reversed the grant
of habeas corpus relief and affirmed Williams' conviction.
INTRODUCTION
In affirming Williams' conviction, the Supreme Court, in
an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, justified its
disposition of the case by ruling on two separate and distinct
issues of law: First, it validated the search for and seizure of
the pistol and Williams' subsequent arrest for illegal possession
thereof under the rationale set forth in Terry v. Ohio;" second,
it upheld the validity of the later search of Williams' person
and of the car (after the arrest) and the seizure of items
thereby found, reasoning that it was a "proper" search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, citing Brinegar v. United
States9 and Carroll v. United States as authority. 10
In order to treat these two distinct issues of the Adams
decision, this comment is divided into two separate parts. The
first part will set forth in some detail the reasoning and author-
ity employed by the Court in its opinion; the second part will
analyze the significance and possible ramifications of the
Court's holdings.
I. THE Adams DECISION
A. Stop and Frisk
It is the first of the two above-mentioned issues with which
the Court actually concerned itself and to which it dedicated
all but the last few lines of its opinion. In dealing with the
legality of the seizure of the pistol from Williams' waistband,
the Court held that the doctrine enunciated in Terry was ap-
plicable to the facts of this case and that the initial search
and seizure of the pistol, though based on less than probable
cause for arrest, fell within the narrow limitations prescribed
by Terry for a "limited intrusion" which is "reasonable" under
the fourth amendment.
1'
The ruling in Terry announced the principle that certain
limited invasions of an individual's fourth amendment right
to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures are not
7 Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971).
8 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9 338 U.S. 160 (1949), cited in 407 U.S. at 149.
1I 267 U.S. 132 (1925), cited in 407 U.S. at 149.
11 407 U.S. at 148.
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per se unreasonable nor unconstitutional when, depending on
the circumstances at the time, 12 they are based upon an articu-
lable suspicion of criminal activity (though less than probable
cause) which affords a police officer the reasonable belief that
a crime is being or is about to be committed and that the per-
son with whom the officer is dealing is presently armed and
dangerous.13 Under such circumstances a police officer has
the right to stop and frisk the subject- to detain the person
temporarily and conduct a limited "pat down" search for
weapons- in order to investigate the activity of which he is
suspicious.
It was the contention of the respondent in Adams, and of
dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, and, to a limited extent,
Douglas,14 that even under the standards of Terry the initial
seizure of Williams' pistol was unreasonable under the fourth
amendment; that an uncorroborated tip from an unnamed in-
formant is not sufficient in itself, absent other grounds for sus-
picion, to justify the police officer's actions.' 5
The majority of the Court, however, clearly disagreed with
this contention and found that such information, under the cir-
cumstances, was sufficient grounds upon which the officer
could lawfully seize the gun"' and that the gun was therefore
properly admissible as evidence. 17 Having so concluded, the
Court then reasoned that since the gun was found where the
informant had indicated it would be, this tended to act as cor-
roboration for the rest of the informant's tip and clearly af-
forded the officer the probable cause sufficient to arrest
Williams lawfully for illegal possession of the gun.'8
B. Warrantless Car Search
The second major issue resolved by the Adams Court in
12 392 U.S. at 29. Accord, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S 40, 59 (1968),
wherein the Court reaffirmed this aspect of the Terry ruling, holding
that "[tlhe constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently
the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual
context of the individual case."
13 392 U.S. at 26-27.
14 Mr. Justice Douglas based his dissent primarily on second amendment
grounds. 407 U.S. at 149-51.
15 The dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall clearly expostulate the
view that such a tip from an unnamed informant under these circum-
stances lacked the credibility and reliability necessary to justify the
reasonableness cf the officer's action in seizing the pistol. 407 U.S. at
153-61.
16 "Since we conclude that the policeman's actions here conformed to the
standards this Court laid down in Terry v. Ohio .... " 407 U.S. at 144.
17 Id. at 148.
18 Id. The Court based this finding on the definition of probable cause
to arrest set out in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
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affirming Williams' conviction involved the validity of the sub-
sequent search for and seizure of items found on Williams' per-
son and in his car after the arrest. In ruling that these actions
were valid as being incident to a lawful arrest, the Court, in
contrast to its detailed consideration of the first issue, paid
almost no attention to this element of the decision. No argu-
ment was set forth in its behalf; nowhere in any of the dis-
senting opinions is the issue or its merits discussed. Clearly
preoccupied with the question of Terry's application to the case
at hand, the Court summarily disposed of the car search issue
with the following language which is to be found in the last
paragraph of the majority opinion and which represents the sum
total of the Court's reported consideration of the matter:
Under the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of
the gun seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the weapons
charge was supported by probable cause, and the search of his
person and of the car incident to that arrest was lawful....
The fruits of the search were therefore properly admitted at
Williams' trial, and the Court of Appeals erred in reaching a
contrary conclusion.1 9
II. TH Adams DEcIsION ANALYZED
The reasoning of the Court outlined above appears relatively
straightforward; however, further analysis of specific aspects
of the two major issues reveals developments in the law not
apparent on the face of the Adams opinion. With respect to the
issue of the initial stop and frisk, it will be shown in Section
A how Adams has expanded or "put flesh to the bones"
20 of
Terry (1) as it applies to uncorroborated informants' tips
and (2) as it reflects Mr. Justice Harlan's argument in Terry
that the doctrine authorizes forcible stops and that the con-
comitant right to frisk for weapons follows automatically
thereafter, without any requirement that the officer first make
reasonable inquiries.
Dealing with the second issue-the subsequent car search
-Section B is likewise divided into two subsections. The first
subsection will analyze the general area of warrantless car
searches and demonstrate how the Court has developed two
distinct and dissimilar rationales for constitutionally justifying
such searches. The second subsection will point out not only
how the Adams Court has apparently disregarded this distinc-
tion by citing the precedent for one rationale while couching
its holding in the language of the other, but will also speculate
as to the possible ramifications of this incongruity.
19 407 U.S. at 149.
2" Id. at 153 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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A. The Adams Expansion of the Terry Doctrine
1. The Role of the Informer's Tip
It is made clear in Adams that the strict requirements of
the rule established in Aguilar v. Texas,21 and later clarified in
Spinelli v. United States, 22 for determining the reliance officers
may lawfully place on information from informants, is not
applicable in Adams-type stop and frisk cases under the ration-
ale of Terry. In exploring the rationale behind this new ap-
proach, it is to be noted, first, that both Aguilar and Spinelli
dealt with the sufficiency of affidavits in support of a find-
ing of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant and
an arrest warrant respectively, and hence were dealing with
probable cause requirements specifically and not the "narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search" 23 under certain
circumstances as was outlined in Terry.
24
Specifically, the Aguilar-Spinelli "two-pronged test" 25 does
not require that a finding of probable cause be based on direct
personal observation of the affiant; it may be based upon hear-
say information. 26 When such is the case, as with informants'
tips, the affiant must reveal sufficient "underlying circum-
stances" from which a magistrate could conclude that there are
reasonable grounds for (1) the affiant's belief that the inform-
ant himself is reliable or credible and (2) the informant's con-
clusion that what he said is true; i.e., that there is some basis
upon which the informant founded his information.
27
Even though the Court in Adams recognized that Aguilar
and Spinelli established the general rule to be applied in in-
formant-probable cause situations,28 the Adams decision indi-
cates that such requirements are not relevant to cases which
are founded, under Terry, upon an "articulable suspicion less
than probable cause.' '29 The crucial point would seem to be
that since stop and frisk intrusions themselves need not meet
exacting probable cause standards to be "reasonable," there is
no reason why such standards should be applied just because
the officer happens to be acting on the basis of an informant's
21 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
22 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
23 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
24 Id. at 25-27.
25 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969).
2 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), citing as authority for this
proposition Jcnes v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
27 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
28 407 U.S. at 147.
2,, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (emphasis added).
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tip rather than on his own personal observation. The Court in
Adams quite specifically adopted this position when it held that
"[w]e reject respondent's argument that reasonable cause for
a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's personal
observation, rather than on information supplied by another
person."30
In refusing to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli: criteria to stop
and frisk cases, the Court has now adopted the view, in appar-
ent disregard of earlier lower court decisions on the matter, "
that such tips and information merely have about them
"enough indicia of reliability" to justify the particular intru-
sion.32 Though the Court announced no clear objective criteria
as to what shall constitute "enough indicia" (indicating that
such determination must depend on the circumstances of a
given case), it did indicate that some "tips" would not warrant
the intrusion.33 For the purpose of deciding the issue in Adams,
however, it simply noted that the informant was known to the
officer personally, had supplied him information in the pastF4
had come forward personally to give the information, and the
tip was immediately verifiable at the scene. These circum-
stances were sufficient to meet this "indicia of reliability"
test.35
It is quite apparent, moreover, that the Court in Adams
has rejected any notion that Terry requires any direct police
observation of the supposed unusual and suspicious conduct.
Adams specifically stands for the proposition that tips from un-
named informants will suffice at least where the officer is in
a position to verify the tip at the scene. Any language of the
majority opinion in Terry to the contrary3" would seem now
to be only so much surplusage.
30 407 U.S. at 147.
31 See, e.g., Ballou v. Massachusetts, 403 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1968). The court
there held that an anonymous phone tip to the police, when combined
with specific facts known to the officers at the time and visual corrobo-
ration at the scene, afforded the police the reasonable suspicion suf-
ficient to justify their actions under Terry. The Ballou court went on,
however, to warn that (1) "such a trip must be linked to other facts
known by the police," and (2) "the critical question is the accuracy
of the tip, to be assured both by its specificity and capability cf being
substantially corroborated by observation." Id. at 986.
32 407 U.S. at 147.
33 Id.
34 Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent attacked this aspect of the decision by
pointing out that the past information supplied by this informant was
hardly of the type to clearly establish his reliability as a credible
source of information and that even under Terry an officer cannot jus-
tify "an invasion of liberty" on the basis of "unreliable, unsubstanti-
ated, conclusory hearsay." Id. at 156-59.
35 Id. at 146.
36 See Terry excerpt, p. 249 infra.
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2. The Harlan View Prevails
The application of Terry in Adams is also noteworthy in
that it gives a rather clear indication that it is the Harlan con-
figuration of the Terry rule which will prevail, rather than that
of Mr. Chief Justice Warren who wrote the majority opinion.
The specific ruling of the majority in Terry was expressed as
follows:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes un-
usual ccnduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and pres-
ently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this be-
havior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reason-
able inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the en-
counter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.37
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, in his concurring opinion,
argued that this language left some crucial areas of the theory
underlying Terry in doubt and that "a few gaps" needed to be
filled in.38 It was his contention that two things were left out
of the majority opinion which are essential to the rule. He
argued first that it is vital that the "articulable suspicion less
than probable cause" which will justify a limited protective
search carries with it, of necessity, the right "to make a forci-
ble stop."'30 Second, the right to search for weapons in such
situations "follows automatically" and immediately upon the
stop, 40 and there is no reason why the officer should be re-
q'uired to "ask one question and take the risk that the answer
might be a bullet."'4 1 Apparently, it was his concern that any
requirement holding that officers must first make inquiries
before frisking was one which posed a serious threat to such
police activities.
It is apparent from Adams that Mr. Justice Harlan's views
have prevailed on these two points. Not only did the Adams
Court use the term "forcible stop" specifically and repeatedly
in describing the police conduct in question,42 but the descrip-
tion of the factual situation in the case in no way reveals any
37 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 31.
30 Id. at 31-32.
40 Id. at 34.
41 Id. at 33.
42 407 U.S. at 146-47.
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inquiries or questioning of Williams by the police officer (other
than the "request" that he open the car door). The Court, more-
over, did not even discuss the issue in the opinion and made no
effort to deal with the absence of such interrogative endeavors
by the officer. Only Mr. Justice Marshall brought up the ques-
tion of such a requirement.43 However, since his was one of
the three dissenting opinions, it may be surmised that al-
though the issue was perhaps in deliberation, it was felt by the
majority of the Court to be of little consequence, or at least
not a controlling consideration under Terry.
From these initial, rather cursory observations on the more
obvious effects of the Adams decision upon the Terry doctrine,
it is clear that this case will exert a telling influence on stop
and frisk case law.44 By extending Terry (at least apparently)
to certain types of possessory offenses and by allowing unsub-
stantiated informants' tips to suffice as the basis upon which
an officer may initiate, without further inquiry, a forcible stop
and frisk, a significant expansion of Terry has been recog-
nized.45 Leaving this aspect of Adams aside, however, this
comment now turns to a much subtler and perhaps more in-
triguing element of the decision - that dealing with a warrant-
less car search.
B. Two Distinct Rationales for Warrantless Car Searches: Has
Adams Disregarded the Distinction?
1. Car Search Case Law- The Development of Search In-
cident and Probable Cause Rationales
Over the years, case law dealing with warrantless car
searches has developed at least two different and distinct
theories upon which such searches may be justified: searches
incident to a lawful arrest, and searches which are based upon
probable cause. Through a process of evolution and sophistica-
tion these two approaches have come to stand upon entirely
separate grounds, each having certain limitations and qualifica-
tions not found in the other. This inquiry will turn first to the
development of the "search incident" rationale.
43 Id. at 157-61.
44 For more lengthy and expilict analyses of the impact of Adams upon
Terry, see Note, The Predicates of Suspicion: Stop and Frisk on an
Informant's Tip - Extending Terry to Possessory Offenses, 49 N.D.L.
REv. 127 (1972); Comment, The Informant's Tip and Terry's "Reason-
able Conclusion" - A Modified Standard, 4 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 167
(1972).
45 See generally LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 Micu. L. REv. 40 (1968); Note, Stop and
Frik: The Issue Unresolved, 49 J. URBAN L. 733 (1972).
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a. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
In Chimel v. California,4' the recent landmark decision
which dealt with the "permissible scope under the Fourth
Amendment of a search incident to a lawful arrest, '47 the Su-
preme Court, in charting the grounds for its decision, supplied
an enlightening retrospection of the development of the judicial
treatment of warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests.
The Court in Chimel noted, first, that the concept of the
legitimacy of warrantless searches incident to arrest started as
dictum in the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United States48 where
the arresting officer was said to have a right to search the
person of an arrestee.4" The notion of such a lawful right was
then expanded by an "embellishment of the Weeks state-
ment"50 in Carroll v. United States5 1 in 1925. In dictum, the
Carroll Court extended the scope of such a search beyond the
person to the "places" which were "in his control. '52 The
Chimel Court, more than 40 years later, noted, however, that
Carroll's expansion of the doctrine "was far from a claim that
the 'place' where one is arrested may be searched so long as
the arrest is valid.
5 3
In the same year as Carroll, in Agnello v. United States,
54
the Carroll language regarding the "places" which could be law-
fully searched as incident to arrest was expanded to encom-
pass the idea that such searches could extend to the place
where the arrest was made "in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which
it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect
an escape from custody."5 5 Agnello went on to hold that such
a right, however, does not extend to other places "remote"
from the scene of the arrest, and such searches could not be
properly justified as "incident" to arrest.
56
Following Agnello came a line of cases which further de-
veloped the idea that the real problem and limitation under
search incident justification is the lawful scope of such searches.
46 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
47 Id. at 753.
48 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
41 Id., as interpreted in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969).
5,) Id.
5' 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3- Id. at 158, as construed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1914).
53 395 U.S. at 756.
54 269U.S. 20 (1925).
, Id. at 30.
56 Id. at 31.
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In 1927, Marron v. United States57 upheld the seizure of
items not enumerated in a search warrant because, since the
search was made after the arrest of the petitioner (and there-
fore could be justified as a search incident to that arrest), the
proper scope of such a search could then extend to the whole
situs of the arrest and to anything which could be connected
to the criminal enterprise for which the arrest was made.
Some years later, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States,58 and also in United States v. Lefkowitz, 59 the thrust
of the Marron decision was blunted by the limitation that
searches of the whole situs of the arrest could not involve a
"general search or rummaging of the place," but must be
restricted to items "visible and accessible and in the offender's
immediate custody."60
According to the Court in Chimel, this limitation was
"thrown to the winds"'6 1 with the ruling in Harris v. United
States62 which authorized the search of an entire four-room
apartment as a proper search incident to an arrest. On the
heels of Harris, however, came Trupiano v. United States
6 3
which. severely limited the application of a search incident
justification of the scope allowed in Harris to only those situa-
tions where the obtaining of a search warrant is impracticable.
Specifically, the Trupiano decision held that something more
"in the way of necessity" 64 than merely the existence of a law-
ful arrest was required to uphold such warrantless searches;
if it was practicable to obtain a search warrant first, then even
a search "incident" to an arrest could not proceed without it.
Trupiano, however, was short-lived, being overruled in
1950 by United States v. Rabinowit. 65 In Rabinowitz the Court
authorized a search incident to arrest much like that in Harris.
In doing so, the Court held that it is the "reasonableness" of
such searches, not the practicability of obtaining a warrant,
which is the test.66 Looking back to Weeks and Carroll, the
Court founded this position on the idea that the right to search
the person or places in his "immediate control"6 7 is dependent
57 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
58 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
,9 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
GO 282 U.S. at 358.
61 395 U.S. at 757.
62 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
63 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
64 Id. at 708.
,r 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
"" Id. at 66.
6 Id. at 63.
VOL. 50
COMMENT
merely upon the validity of the arrest itself, not upon the im-
practicability of getting a warrant; given a lawful arrest, the
only question remaining is the reasonableness of the scope of
the search. In Rabinowitz, the fact that the search was
"limited," in that it was confined to those areas within the re-
spondent's "immediate control," made it both reasonable and
valid.'8
Finally in 1969, after having reviewed all of these cases,
Chimel recognized that the real issue in warrantless searches
incident to arrest is not their initial justification -which, as
was carefully pointed out in Rabinowitz, is dependent only on
the validity and lawfulness of the arrest - but their "permis-
sible scope under the Fourth Amendment."6 9 The Chimel Court
then went on to overrule Rabinowitz to the extent that searches
justified as incident to lawful arrest may be conducted of the
person and of the area within his immediate control, construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
70
This severe limitation on the scope of such searches was
based, according to the Chimel Court, on the underlying ration-
ale for justifying any warrantless search as "incident" to arrest;
i.e., that it is necessary to prevent escape, a weapons-assault
on the arresting officer, or the destruction of criminal evidence.
This rationale, the Court noted, has been enunciated in other
cases as well 7' and was present in the decision rendered in the
case of Preston v. United States.7 2 In Preston, the search inci-
dent rationale would have validated a contemporaneous auto-
mobile search had it not been, vis-A-vis Agnello, too "remote"
in time and place.7 3 Although perhaps not significant as new
precedent in the general development of the search incident
approach, Preston is a pivotal case, however, in that the Chimel
Court by indirection (in citing Preston with approval) has
placed warrantless car searches within the confining grasp of
the now-controlling rule of Chimel.
4
68 Id.
69 395 U.S. at 753.
7) Id. at 764.
7 Id. The Ccurt noted that this rationale was clearly set out in Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), where a search incident to arrest was
upheld "only because" its scope had been "reasonably limited" by the"need to seize weapons" or "prevent the destruction of evidence."
72 376 U.S. 364 (1964), cited in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764
(1964).
73 376 U.S. at 368.
74 See Comment, Chirnel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle
Searches, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 626 (1970).
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b. Probable Cause Searches
Having explored the development of case law dealing with
the "search incident" rationale used to justify warrantless
searches, and noting that Chimel has now clearly established
that the problem to be overcome in legitimating such a ration-
ale is the proper scope of the search, this inquiry now turns to
an investigation of the alternative rationale of "probable cause"
searches.
As mentioned earlier, the Chimel Court spoke of the fact
that a search incident approach in Preston would have suc-
ceeded had the search not been too remote from the arrest.
The decision in the case, however, did not turn on this ruling.
As an alternative to the search incident rationale, with its con-
comitant scope problem, the Preston Court based its holding
upon the validation of the search as being one within the para-
meters of a "probable cause" rationale. Viewing the Preston
decision with approval, the Chimel Court observed that this
alternative rationale, first enunciated in Carroll, is not at all
inconsistent with the search incident approach.
75
Turning to Carroll, the correctness of the Chimel Court's
observation is evident. As was noted earlier, Carroll dictum
dealt with the scope of warrantless searches incident to arrest.
The holding in the case, however, was based upon an entirely
new and different rationale. Carroll was in fact not a case
dealing with a search conducted after an arrest. It was con-
cerned with a warrantless search conducted before there were
grounds to arrest, and for that reason the petitioner had argued
that since there was no lawful arrest there could then be no
valid search "incident" thereto. 6 The Court, however, justified
this search by constructing a detailed schema based upon the
"necessary difference" between the search of houses and other
structures and the search of mobile vehicles like cars. 7  This
difference, according to the Carroll Court, lay in the fact that
cars "can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which [a] warrant must be sought," and in light of this
reality, it is often simply "not practicable" to secure a warrant.78
The Carroll Court then went on to hold that-as dis-
tinguished from the justification of a search as incident to a
lawful arrest - an automobile search, under circumstances mak-
75 395 U.S. at 764 n.9.
711267 U.S. at 158.




ing it impracticable to obtain a warrant, could be conducted
without a warrant upon a showing of "probable cause for
believing that [the vehicle was] carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.'1 7" The Carroll approach, then, based the validity
of such searches upon probable cause grounds, and not upon
any search incident rationale. Moreover, in further holding
that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used," and "[i]n cases where seizure is
impossible except without a warrant, the seizing officer acts
unlawfully" except upon a showing of such probable cause,80
the Carroll Court made it clear that a showing of circumstances
rendering the obtaining of a warrant impracticable was at least
as important as was a showing of probable cause.
In later cases the Carroll doctrine was clarified and the
distinction between probable cause searches and searches inci-
dent to arrest was given solidity and substance.
In Brinegar v. United States,8 ' the Court found the material
facts to be virtually "indistinguishable" from those found in
Carroll 25 years earlier8 2 and affirmed the applicability of that
approach.
As was discussed earlier, Preston distinguished the probable
cause and search incident rationales and noted specifically that
the police have the right to search a car contemporaneously at
the scene of an arrest "either because the arrest [is] valid or
because [they] had probable cause." 83
In 1970, after the Chimel ruling, the Court handed down a
a decision in Chambers v. Maroney8 4 which was clearly an ap-
plication of the Carroll probable cause rationale and which
strengthened the Carroll requirement that a showing of exigent
circumstances making the obtaining of a warrant impracticable
is as important as a showing of probable cause. After finding
that a car search could not be justified as incident to arrest, 5
the Court held that "alternative grounds" based on Carroll could
be found to justify the search.8 6 The Court reasoned that "the
search of an auto on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly
different from that justifying the search incident to an arrest.
8 7
79 Id. at 154.
80 Id. at 156.
81 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
82 Id. at 171.
83 376 U.S. at 367-68 (emphasis added).
N4 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
85 Id. at 47.
S6 Id.
87 Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
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The Chambers Court then reasserted the Carroll requirement
that such probable cause searches are always dependent upon
"exigent circumstances," making it impracticable for the police
to obtain a warrant, and that without a clear showing of such
exigencies even probable cause to conduct the search falls
short."'
Chambers, however, departed significantly from the impli-
cations of prior holdings when it dealt specifically with the
temporal aspects of the probable cause-exigent circumstances
relationship. Having established that probable cause existed to
justify the seizure of an auto, and that exigent circumstances
then also existed to fully validate such seizure under Carroll,
the Chambers Court then went on to hold that a later search
of the car at the police station was thereby justified. This rather
confusing position (somehow having avoided the question of
exigent circumstances at the time of the search as opposed to
the time of the seizure) was based on the reasoning that once
an initial seizure was justifiable under Carroll there could be
no logical difference between holding the car to obtain a war-
rant and searching later without one. 9
As late as June 1971, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"'
the Court had continued to maintain that a showing of exigent
circumstances is critical to the justification of a warrantless car
search on probable cause grounds. There is evidence, however,
that the Coolidge ruling, insofar as it apparently limited the
Chambers approach (in dealing with the issue of exigent cir-
cumstances) to cases where a moving vehicle was actually
stopped by the police, is now being very strictly construed by
lower courts in favor of a Chambers-oriented analysis.9 1
c. Probable Cause and Search Incident Rationales:
A Brief Summation
In view of the foregoing it would seem clear that, at least
prior to Adams, the Supreme Court had established that auto-
88 Id. at 51, where the Court held that "[o]nly in exigent circumstances will
the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient
authorization for a search."
81) Id. at 52.
" 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
911 See, e.g., United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir 1973) (no war-
rant required for search of parked truck following stakeout); United
States V. Cohn, 472 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1973) (permitting warrantless
seizure 19 hours after warrantless search disclosed contraband). These
cases might be regarded as examples of how Chambers may be used to
counter the limitations imposed by Coolidge, under the implication that
initial exigent circumstances somehow do not disappear even after a
substantial passage of time. Such reasoning, it is here argued, is a clear
distortion of the logic of Carroll.
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mobile searches without warrants may be justified on at least
two separate and distinct grounds, each having its own set of
unique requirements and limitations.
The first of these grounds is that of "search incident to a
lawful arrest." Under this rationale, the special difficulty which
must be overcome is the permissible scope of the search. As
to this requirement, pre-Adams cases would seem to be gov-
erned by the holding in Chimel which limits such a search
to the person of the arrestee and the places within his "im-
mediate control." Specifically, such "places" are limited to those
areas into which the arrestee might reach to obtain weapons
or to conceal or destroy evidence. Moreover, Chimel applies
this limitation to car searches, at least to the extent that it
interpreted Preston in this manner.
The second ground for justifying a warrantless car search
is based on the rationale of Carroll, which, as a distinctly dif-
ferent theory, validates such a search on the basis of a find-
ing of probable cause. This approach is limited, however, by
the fact that probable cause must always be accompanied
by a showing of "exigent circumstances" which render the
obtaining of a warrant impracticable under the circumstances.
It is important to remember that Carroll founded its exi-
gent circumstances requirement upon the unique dissimilarity
between houses, which do not move, and automobiles, which
do. In this regard, it is crucial to realize that such "mobility,"
in Carroll, was due not so much to any intrinsic qualities of
the automobile as to the simple fact that at the time the search
was conducted there was no way for the police to prevent its
mobility. The police had no probable cause upon which to
arrest the subjects and hence no way to validate any real
detention of the car by way of an argument attempting to
justify it as a search or seizure "incident" to an arrest.
2. Does Adams Fit In?
The Adams Court declares the search of a car lawful as
being "incident to [a lawful] arrest," citing Carroll and Brine-
gar as authorities. But, as has been shown, Carroll did not
uphold a search incident to arrest. Rather, it is the landmark
case for upholding warrantless car searches based upon probable
cause grounds only. Therefore, why the reliance of the Adams
Court on Carroll when upholding the lawfulness of a search as
being one incident to arrest? Certainly the mere fact that a
car search is in issue does not make it automatically fall within
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Carroll, especially in view of subsequent case law on the sub-
ject. More importantly, if the Court were attempting to make
this a true "probable cause" case, as would seem to be indi-
cated by its reliance upon Carroll and Brinegar, why are the
"exigency" requirements not discussed? There is no considera-
tion at all of this second but equally essential element of the
Carroll rationale.
If, on the other hand, the Adams Court were actually up-
holding this search as one incident to a lawful arrest, as would
seem to be indicated by the language used by the Court, where
then is the appropriate precedent? Carroll's treatment of the
search incident rationale was mere dictum, and its discussion
of the "places" which could be searched under that theory has
been mooted by subsequent rulings. Why is there no reference
to or consideration of Chimel, Preston, or even Rabinowitz? 92
In short, the Adams Court has not only failed to cite proper
authority, it in no way resolved the correlative search incident
question of the proper scope of the search.
It may always be argued, of course, that these considerations
were simply never put in issue before the Court or, even if
they were, they were rendered moot by the fact that the search
of Williams' person had already turned up both the gun and
narcotics. Thus, the subsequent car search may have had little
real bearing on the case. But, in an area so rapidly changing as
that of search and seizure law, such valid contentions as may
exist in the Court's favor must always be suspect, especially
where there is no supportive argument in evidence at all.
Admitting that speculation may be precarious when based
on no more than the fact that the Court has neglected to speak
to a potentially important issue, it is possible that Adams may
be one of those cases. which marks the beginning of a new or
at least different approach to a controversial area of law.
9 3
It is apparent, for example, that the Court is not yet pre-
pared to rule specifically upon whether or not the arrest of
92 See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), in which Chimel was
held to be prospective only. Since the search of the defendant in Adams
occurred before the decision in Chimel was handed down, Rabinowitz
would have been controlling precedent for the Adams case as to search
incident law.
93 That Adams may have a substantial impact in the area of car searches
is amply illustrated by United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.
1972). In this case, after developing an intriguing justification for "im-
puting" the knowledge of one police officer to another, the court appar-
ently reasoned that in Carroll-type situations, with exigent circum-
stances but absent full probable cause, Adams may be used to apply
Terry to car searches, allowing such searches on the basis of reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause.
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a person (1) who is in or with a car on the public streets, (2)
who is handcuffed or at least placed in custody out of reach
of that car, and (3) who is so detained until the arrival of other
police officers who then search the car, has so "immobilized"
that automobile, absent other circumstances, as to remove the
situation from the realm of "exigent circumstances" required
for probable cause car searches.
It is possible that the Court, though it undoubtedly could
have articulated the probable cause necessary for a Carroll
rationale, even under a Chambers analysis, has considered in-
stead that the unique problems of car searches exempt them
from any "exigency" test at all where they are otherwise
"reasonable," especially when they are in fact contemporaneous
to a lawful arrest. If such is the case, it is incumbent on the
Court to articulate its reasoning.
It is also possible that the Court may be paving the first
steps in an effort to exempt contemporaneous car searches
totally from the strict limitations imposed upon search inci-
dent justifications by Chimel.
Finally, isn't it entirely possible that the Supreme Court
has simply disposed of these issues in a careless and confusing
manner?
However speculative the nature of the above observations,
the Court's treatment (or non-treatment) of the car search in
Adams has afforded its observers a unique opportunity to con-
sider the past development and present status of such case
material in our Supreme Court.
Frederick D. Lewis, Jr.

